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Abstract-Environmental control agencies are faced with a stochastic intertemporal optimization problem. 
This paper extends the traditional static-deterministic model applied in the economics of environmental 
resources to an adaptive control problem. The interdependence of decisions on the levels at which to set 
pollution controls and actions to be taken to reduce uncertainty is established; the imposition of an input 
tax as a means of internalizing risk costs in the case of a risk-averse society is also shown to be required. 
Finally, a new method to obtain an environmental policy with dual characteristics has been suggested. 
This new environmental control policy, which is obtained by introducing a learning factor in the agency’s 
objective function, attempts both to precisely estimate the environmental process parameters and make 
good environmental control. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Since the time of Pigou, a large body of economic literature has developed which advocates the 
use of effluent fees to internalize environmental externalities. Despite their many advantages, ideal 
fees do not appear to be a particularly promising tool for environmental quality management in 
practice, mainly because the damage of pollution or benefit of pollution abatement is seldom well- 
known. 
To avoid the need to measure environmental damages resulting from pollution (which include 
factors such as the effects on and the value of health as well as aesthetic values) many economists, 
including Dales [l J and Baumol and Oates [2], have suggested the use of fees to achieve fixed 
environmental standards selected by the environmental authorities on the basis of all available 
information. Although this type of effluent charge does not result in a Pareto optimal solution, the 
standards are presumed operational, since policy makers quite naturally think in terms of minimum 
acceptability standards, and, at least in principle, the total cost of achieving the standards will be 
minimized so long as firms minimize production costs [2]. 
However, even the determination of effluent fees to achieve fixed environmental standards is 
hindered by various types of uncertainty in practice. At present, the literature on the regulation of 
the environment under uncertainty is quite limited and although specific types of uncertainty have 
received some attention in the past [e.g. 2-101, most researchers usually assume that environmental 
system dynamics (dispersion relationships), pollution levels and preference parameters (such as 
prices, costs or social benefits per unit of output produced) are known with certainty and hence 
are accessible to environmental control agencies, at no cost, which violates reality. In the real 
world, an internalization scheme must explicitly recognize that the environmental :xternality 
dynamics, including the evolution of pollution levels over time and the impact to control actions 
and random disturbances upon that evolution, involves uncertainty. In addition, the environmental 
system output (pollutant concentrations) as well as preference function parameters cannot be 
observed perfectly, and an information gathering system must be employed. The precision of this 
information gathering system along with conventional environmental measures (such as effluent 
fees) are control variables available to the environmental control agencies and, under the assumption 
of efficiency, there is no reason to expect the minimization of the uncertainty and information 
gathering costs to be less important than the gains obtained from internalization of externalities. 
Yet, most existing economic models make no provision for evaluating such measurement 
considerations. 
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The present paper explores, in the context of an adaptive control problem, the effect of different 
types of uncertainty on optimal environmental policy. Specifically, the effects of the following types 
of uncertainty are considered: 
(9 
(ii) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
uncertainty about the form and parameter values of the environmental system 
dynamics (dispersion relationships);? 
uncertainty in the measurement of pollutant concentrations; 
uncertainty about the prices in the output and the input market; 
probabilistic environmental quality standards& 9 
Our concern here is with the implications of the above types of uncertainty for regulatory (emission), 
price i,lformation gathering and measurement (of pollution level) controls. The Kalman filtering 
technique (as discussed in Kalman [ll] and Anderson and Moore [12], for example) and the 
Maximum Principle of Pontryagin provide the basis for analyzing the implications of the various 
types of uncertainty.r 
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 examines the components of public agency control 
(as in Papakyriazis [13]). It is hoped that this formulation is sufficiently realistic and equally valid 
in the theory of environmental control of any natural resource system. The multiperiod adaptive 
control problem of environmental externalities is set forth in Section 3. Although the general 
environmental control problem considered in this section can, in principle, be formulated as a 
closed-loop (adaptive) control problem, its solution cannot be obtained analytically and two 
approximate [the passively adaptive open-loop feedback (OLF) and the actively adaptive open- 
loop feedback dual (OLFD)] solutions are considered. Under the conditions specified, the analysis 
shows that the environmental agency’s actions involve the joint determination of: regulatory 
(emission rate) and price information gathering controls; sequential estimation of inaccessible 
pollutant concentrations, prices and transfer function parameters by means of the Kalman filter; 
and pollutant concentration measurement controls. The two sets of controls are shown not to be 
separable in the sense that when dispersion relationship parameters are unknown, and thus have 
to be estimated along with the other unknowns of the problem, optimal effluent and input fees 
cannot be determined independently of the price information and pollution level measurement 
controls. Finally, Section 4 presents some conclusions. 
2. THE MODEL 
We assume first that all residuals are generated in production and no residuals are generated in 
consumption.tt In addition, we assume that each firm produces only one commodity. Within a 
particular airshed or watershed then, each firm produces its product with a set of variable (flow) 
factors and a stock factor “capital”. Hence, each firm is subject to both internal and external 
adjustment costs in the purchase and employment of the capital factor [e.g. 15-J. 
There are .I firms in the region, each with a production function 
4jt =fir(LIj,,rIj,,KIj,),SS i = 1~2~~~~~J~Vt; (1) 
t Since damages emanating from environmental externalities take place at receptor locations which differ from emitter 
locations. an environmental externality is envisioned in this paper as a dynamic system, the state of which is considered to 
be the pollutant concentrations as a finction of time and location; the level of emissions as a function of time and location 
constitute the controllable inputs of the dynamic system with uncontrollable inputs of meteorology. 
2 Such standards are used, for example, in the Swedish air pollution abatement policy, and in E.E.C. countries’ waier 
pollution abatement policy. 
SThe environmental control authorities usually are aware that emission rates are themselves also subject to stochastic 
influences. We abstract from such problems in this paper. 
~The analysis is partial, distributional aspects are ignored and political problems of regulating the environment are 
assumed not to exist. 
tt Consumption residuals are discussed, for example, in Miller [lb]. 
$: The function jA) is well-behaved with (aJ,,CyaL,,) = k, > 0, (aYJ.l/al,,) = fjr2 < 0, @j;,c.l/aK,,) =Jp3 > 0. 
(~ZC/;,(‘)l/CaL1J2) = frjrl1 < '3 (~~Cfj~9l/C~~,,,l) = fi122< 09 (a2Efj,(‘)l/CaK1jJ2) = j;233 < 0; s = 1,2,...,S; 
j = 1, 2 ,..., J;VI. 
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where qjr is the rate of output produced by firm j at time t, L,, = (Lllj,Llzjt.. .Llslj,) = 
{Llsjl}f~ 1 is the set of variable factors employed by firm j at time t, lIj, is the rate of purchase of 
the capital used by the jth firm at time t and Krj, is the capital stock of firm j at time t. The 
investment variable, Iljr, in the production function of the jth firm in equation (1) represents the 
internal costs of adjustment concerning the capital factor of production [16]. 
Jointly with 4jr, I different residuals denoted by gj, = (g, jtgzjt.. . grj,) = {gij,}!, r are produced. 
We can write the residuals’ generating function as follows:? 
gjr = gjr(Lljl,Klj,,zljr;L2j~,Kzjt),S j = 1,2,-..7J,Vf. (2) 
Assuming the absence of monopoly elements in both output and input markets for simplicity, 
let i2jt,iC’sr and Gkl be the observed price of the output produced by the jth firm at time t, the 
observed price of the sth variable factor at time I and the observed price of the capital good at 
time t, respectively, with 
jijt=7Cj,+Y,jrs,jr, j= 1,2,...,J, (3) 
@St = w,, + Y&,1? s=12 3 ,...,Sl,(Sl + lL...,S, (4) 
%r = W&t + Yk&kr? Vt, (5) 
and 
I 
njl=7Ljl_r +e,jt, j= 1,2 ,..., J, (6) 
wSf = w,,-~ + esrr s= 1,2 ,...) s, (7) 
Wkr = Wkr- 1 + ekr9 vt. (8) 
Here 71jl, w,, and Wkt are unobserved (“permanent”) components of product and input prices, 
respectively, at time t, E,jr, E,, and &k, are the “transitory” or random “noise” terms corresponding 
to output and input prices and enjt, ear and ek, are the output/input price state equation noise 
sequences with 
W,) = E(e,,) = 0, (9) 
E(s&) = &,&‘, c, - NO, G,), 9: (10) 
E(%&) = Lx,&,~, e,, - NO, L.,), (11) 
(12) 
Pr(YnjrE,jt > -njt) = Wsrh, > - W,,) 
(13) 
t These residuals will, in general, be a function of three factors: (i) the amount of output produced, which is given by 
Llj,, Kljr and I,,,; (ii) the technology used, which is also given by L,,,, 
L2jr = CL ZS,+IV.'.LZSjr) = {t*sjrl:=LS,+l)~ 
Kr,, and Iljn; and (iii)the set of variable factors, 
and capital Kzj,, used for waste treatment by the jth firm at time t. 
$ It is also assumed that each gij,(.), i = 1, 2,. , I, is twice continuously differentiable and convex. 
@The main justification for assuming normality is provided by the central limit theorem which, in the context of our 
discussion, implies that the output and input prices will be normally distributed if their randomness is caused by many 
underlying disturbances which operate additively and independently. Although normality has many attractive features, it 
does have the disadvantage that the random variable may take on negative values. But, if the mean is sufficiently large 
relative to the variance, the probability of this occurring is very small [see equation (13)]. 
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Vt, t’, t # t’; j = 1, 2,. . , J; s = 1, 2,. . . , S; where 
6 = @,1&,2,. . -%~tEl&2t. . ES&)‘, 
L = diag(y,l,y,2,. . I~‘~~J~J~~... wdr 
e A, = (e nlren2r.. . enJtelte2f.. . wd’. 
C,, and &_, are positive definite and positive semidefinite (known) matrices, respectively, and 6,,. 
is the Kronecker delta. The initial unobserved (“permanent”) component of prices rrO = 
({njO)s= l{w~O>S= lwkO) is assumed to be a Gaussian (normal) random vector with (apriori) mean 
&, and variance-covariance c,,, . It is finally assumed that the initial “state” n,, the state equation 
noise sequence {e,,> and the measurement noise sequence {E,) are all mutually independent. 
We take the view here that product and input price observations obtained by the environmental 
control agency are composed of two parts which cannot be separately identified. The first is a 
“true” or “permanent” component and the second is a “transitory” measurement “noise” term, with 
an expected value of zero. The “noise” component is present because product and input prices are 
not perfectly and costlessly observed by the environmental control agency. 
The uncertainty regarding prices, however, can be explicitly eliminated, at least in part, if the 
control agency invests in information gathering activities such as surveys etc. In other words, the 
variance of output and input prices, for example, is not only a measure of the risk inherent in each 
particular market but can also be viewed as an index of the agency’s ignorance concerning 
conditions in each market. More precisely, in this study each diagonal element of I1 is taken as a 
known decreasing function of money or resources invested by the public control agency to collect 
information about output and input prices via research or other search techniques; i.e. 
(@njtCXjrl/dXjt) < 0, j = l,&. ‘7 J, 
@Y,,Cx,,l/~x,,) < 0, s = 1,2,. . . , s, (15) 
k%,Cz&%,) < 0. 
The value of other goods functional (OGF) for time t (I’,,,,,) can be written as 
V 0GF.r - F$t - (Cp,Cup,I) - i Xjr + i x,, + ~kr , 
j= 1 s=1 
where 
i - 
[ 
j$l (CljrC1lj*l + c2jti112jtlJ])? 
(16) 
Here Cljr(Zljt), r = 1, 2, are convex functions of l,j, which, together with &, describe the external 
costs of obtaining the capital goods used in the production of normal goods and for pollution 
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treatment, C,,(.) denotes policy (i.e. administrative, monitoring etc.) costs borne by the emitter firms 
and/or control agency variables at time period t and up, is a vector of policy cost control variables 
at time t (specified below). 
In the case of perfect certainty the environmental control agency selects {L,,; s = 1,2,. . . , 
S}fE1, {l,jt; I = 1,2}!=, (and thus qj1 and {gij,; i = 1,2 ,..., I};= i) and up, in each time period to 
maximize the value of other goods over the time horizon T subject to: (i) a set of environmental 
standards; and (ii) K,j, = (1 - G,j,)K,j,_ 1 + Iljf, I = 1,2, j = 1, 2,. . . , J, where 6,j, is a constant rate 
of capital decay for source j at time t and K,j, is given. Since VooF.* is random, however, this is 
impossible. One obvious possibility is to assume that the normal and treatment inpus as well as 
the price information gathering and policy cost controls are chosen so as to maximize 
Woo,,,) = i P’W3oF.J 
t=1 
= FzE(nt) - E(Cpt(Upt)) - i Xj! + i xst + xkr 
j=l s= 1 
subject to the above constraints, where p = l/( 1 + o), o being the appropriate discount rate. From 
the control agency’s point of view, however, the expected value of other goods criterion (17) is not 
always a satisfactory criterion because ven though one strategy may guarantee the highest expected 
value of other goods over the planning horizon T, it may at the same time be more risky so that 
the chances of obtaining a very low level of other goods value over the time horizon T are increased. 
Alternatively, the environmental control agency may maximize expected value of other goods 
over the planning horizon T subject to a constraint on the “risk” incurred at each time period t, 
i.e. subject to 
var(boF,,) = F’,~CW3 d 4 (18) 
This is, in fact, the approach we shall employ in this study.? In the present context then, the 
environmental control agency selects (L,jt; s = 1, 2,. . . S}j”= 1, {Irjr; r = 1,2}5= 1, {Xjl}f= 1, {x,,}f= 1, 
xkr and up, in each time period to maximize criterion (17) subject to: (i) the variance constraint (18); 
(ii) a set of probabilistic environmental standards; (iii) K,j, = (1 - 6,,)K,j,_ 1 + Irjr, K,j, given and 
r = 1,2; and (iv) other constraints on the emission, price information gathering and measurement 
controls. 
Assuming for simplicity that the dispersion functions describing the determination of the I 
pollution levels at the K receptor locations at time t are linear, we have 
P, = @,P,_ 1 + B,G, + e,, Vt, (19) 
t Other criteria, such as maximizing the lower allowable limit on value of other goods over the planning horizon T 
subject to a given probability that the actual value of other goods falls short of this amount can also be considered [e.g. 171, 
but essentially they are similar to the approach used here. 
Many writers have criticized the mean-variance approach because the conditions under which it is appropriate, given 
the assumption of expected utility maximization, are limited. Specifically, strictly speaking, the mean-variance approach to 
ordering prospects under conditions of uncertainty is a valid decision rule either for the case in which the utility function 
is quadratic or if the value of the output of other goods, in the context of our discussion, is normally distributed and risk 
aversion is assumed (for an exchange of the acceptability of mean-variance analysis see the articles by Borch [18] and 
Feldstein [I93 and the response of Tobin [20]). Despite these limitations, however, we choose the mean-variance (rather 
than the expected utility) approach in this study, because it is mathematically more tractable and it can be implemented 
simply assuming that the decision maker knows the first moments of the variables involved, a requirement that must lead 
itself in a sttaightforward fashion to empirical testing. 
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It will be assumed that the two random vectors e, and V, are uncorrelated with each other Vt, and 
uncorrelated with the initial state vector PO [ll]. Also it is assumed that {e,, enr, q,, S,, 00, V,, e,, 
P,} are all mutually independent.? 
To evaluate alternative policies, an objective function must be specified. On efficiency grounds, 
this function should reflect the costs of controlling environmental externalities, the damages resulting 
from these externalities and policy costs. While some progress in deriving damage cost functions 
has been made [e.g. 231, comprehensive results are not yet available .and the placement of damage 
cost functions which are ill-defined and imprecise into the objective function of the environmental 
control problem, leaves no practical means of filling gaps in our knowledge of managing uncertainty. 
Hence, in this paper we operate with a more realistic specification; namely, environmental quality 
constraints. 
If the pollution levels are stochastic, then the environmental control agency can realistically only 
formulate environmental quality standards in probabilistic terms. Such constraints take the 
following form: 
Pr(P,, 2 P,.,) d a,,, n = 1,2,. . . ) N, (23) 
where “Pr” stands for probability, {P,,},“, 1 = {Pi,& i = 1,2,. . . , Z}fzl is the ith pollution level at 
receptor location k at time C, {Psn,}.“_ 1 = P,~i,; i = 1, 2,. . . , I};= 1 is the highest limit on the amount 
of pollutant i at receptor k at time t$ and a,, is prescribed probability of violating the nth 
environmental constraint at time r. This goal implies that society is willing to tolerate a low 
environmental quality (“high” level of the nth pollutant), but only for a short time during period 
t; for most of the time, the society requires that: (P., d Psn,).$ 
Alternatively, the environmental quality constraints (23) can be expressed in the form 
(p,., - WJ - 4a.t)CWn,)1112 2 0, n = 1,. . . , N, (24) 
t Several special cases of measurement equations (21) are of special interest. Consider first the case in which the 
measurement equations (21), take the form: Y, = W,P, + u,V,, where Y,, P, and V, are as in equations (21). W, is a known 
matrix, but u,. which is a scalar, denotes the measurement policy variable. The parameter u, represents the accuracy of 
observations at time r. If we consider the situation in which p., denotes the number of (independent and identically 
distributed) observations taken at time r at each monitoring station and for all kind of pollutants and then average them 
to obtain the observations 
then u, is related to the number of samples, p_. by the relation u, = (pc,) -i”. It is noted that the variance-covariance of 
the measurement noise term becomes: E(u*V,V;) = u$W, = pc;l’flV,, which, according to the above interpretation of p,,, 
indicates that the measurement variance-covariance matrix is inversely proportional to the number of samples taken at 
time r. Note in particular that Pi, = 0 implies no observations whatsoever are made at time r, and per = co implies perfect 
observation of states at time t. 
$ Here we assume that we have environmental constraints on each type of pollution at each receptor point at time r. 
Other constraints such as (P,, Q P_,,), where PsW., is the highest limit on the amount of weighted pollution concentrations 
at time r, or (PkW, g P,,,,), where PkW, = j, ik, il. w P pollution levels at receptor location k at time t can also be considered. 
All these environmental constraints, however, are essentially similar to the constraints used here. 
8 Under the Clean Air Act, for example, air pollution control programs in the U.S.A. are required to achieve air quality 
standards which are not to be exceeded, on the average, more than once a year. For standards with 1 h averaging periods, 
this is equivalent to obtaining a probability of exceeding the standard of Pr([pollution level], > [standard],) Z 
(l/8760) = 0.00683%. 
Risk and decision maker’s risk aversion is taken into consideration in determining o(,,, at which the nth environmental 
constraint may not be satisfied. As such, environmental control management determines what probability of meeting the 
nth standard they desire. The more adverse the environmental control agency is to “excess” pollution, the higher the 
probability level at which they will cover the environmental quality goal. 
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where E(P,,) and V(P,,) are the mean and the variance of P.,, respectively.? We shall define PA, and 
A*(Q) to bei 
and 
= - A(s), 
so that expression (24) become@ 
{Pin, + A*(a,,)C~(P,,)11’2} 2 0, n = l,L...,N. 
(26) 
(27) 
To evaluate alternative policies we must have some definition of policy costs. But, to develop a 
definition of policy costs which is sufficiently encompassing, is a hard task.7 In this paper we define 
policy costs as the costs of measurement, enforcement and administration so that a predetermined 
environmental constraint is obtained. 
Measurement costs are encountered for obtaining knowledge of every aspect of the environmental 
quality program, including knowledge of emissions, pollution levels, “damages” and establishment 
of environmental standards. In this paper, we shall consider only the (measurement) costs of 
obtaining pollution levels,tt and presume that all other costs of measurement are zero.$$ A general 
cost-of-measurement equation can be specified as follows: 
where CA,(&) is a well-defined (linear or nonlinear) function of u, indicating the costs of measuring 
ambient concentrations at time r borne by the pollution control agency. The functional form of 
CA,(.) can be chosen depending on the application. 
Enforcement costs, in general, include the costs of legal settlements or court determination of 
the amount of emissions, taxing or subsidy mechanisms, administrative costs and firm expenses 
associated with maintaining records etc. In order not to complicate the discussion unduly, we will 
assume in this paper that any enforcement costs may be lumped together with the monitoring 
costs. Finally, administrative costs are assumed to be overhead costs associated with the 
measurement and enforcement efforts. In this context, then, the administrative costs may be lumped 
together with the other two policy costs. 
t A(r,,)[V(x,,)]’ 2 is determined from the distribution form of P,, or from a nonparametric relationship such as Chebyshev’s 
inequality [e.g. 241. 
: For example, if x,, = 0.05, -A(1 - 0.05) = - 1.645, so that A’(O.05) = 1.645. 
9111 this model, the decision maker has to decide (or specify) two things for each pollutant at each receptor location 
before actually selecting the optimal environmental control strategy. They are the environmental standard P,., and the 
value of risk level z,,. 
ll Do policy costs, for example, include all of the costs of designing and implementing a new institution (such as the EPA) 
aiming at controlling environmental externalities; or only the costs of implementing alternative environmental control 
policies within an already rigidly mandated institutional structure? The answer to this question, to a large extent at least, 
is arbitrary and it depends on the particular analyst. 
tt Quite arbitrarily, they do not include collection information costs about output and input prices which are included 
in the “value of other goods functional” of the environmental control problem. 
:$ Although, in general, the structure of damage relationships (leading to the establishment of the probabilistic 
environmental standards) is uncertain and requires some expenditure for accurate measurement, the assumption that its 
cost of measurement is zero might be a rough, but not necessarily a bad, approximation of reality. For example, in the 
case in which the “magnitude of damages” is positively related to the error of estimation of ambient concentrations, the 
impact on policy decisions of errors in “damage estimation” (environmental standards establishment) will be similar to 
errors in measuring environmental quality. 
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3. THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL AGENCY’S PROBLEM 
Problem Statement 
The control agency’s multiperiod? stochastic environmental control considered in this paper car. 
be stated as follows:: determine the control sequences 
which maximize 
- .il [ x,, + .xlrr + C.&t) III) (29) 
subject to: 
(1) var(F,li,) = (F,V[li,]F,‘) d B,, t = 1,2,. . . , T; 
(2) K,j, = (1 - d,jl)K,j,_ 1 + I,j*, Krj, given, r = 13 2,j = 13 2,. . .t J; 
(3) iij, = 7cjl + ;‘jl(Xjr)&jr, j = 1,2,. . . ,J, 
G S, = w*t + ?‘S,(X,,h~ s= 1,2 )..., s, 
Ekt = Wkr + ;‘kt(Xk,)&k,, t = 1, 2,. . . > T, 
E, - MO; L,); 
(4) 7tjl=Tcjl-1 +ej,, _i= 1,2 ,..., J, 
)*‘sr = wsr - l + es,. .s=1,2 S ,..., 1 
(18) 
(30) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(31) 
(6) 
(7) 
W kr = 'vkf - 1 + ekr3 t= 1,2 (..., T, 
t The selection and enforcement of environmental control measures can take two forms: short-run and long-run controls. 
Short-run (or episode) controls involve a number of direct controls (shutdown and slowdown) measures which are adapted 
over periods of several hours to several days to deal with periods of adverse meteorological conditions. Long-run 
environmental control strategies. on the other hand, involve a set of measures (such as pricing incentives) to be adapted 
over a longer run so that basic pollution abatement procedures are brought into line with normal environmental conditions. 
The determination of short-run and long-run environmental control strategies involves different objectives and constraints. 
The problem we wish to consider m this paper is the determination of long-run environmental control strategies. One way 
of approaching the (long-run) environmental control problem is to consider each period as independent of the others and 
solve a single-period problem for each of the T periods [25]. Since many decisions involve installation of equipment, 
however, the decision to install such equipment in an early period without taking into account its impact in later periods 
may unnecessarily constrain our freedom to act in later years. Hence, decisions made on the basis of what is optimal for 
this period may not be optimal over a longer period. In this paper we will be concerned with the type of environmental 
control measures which. once instituted. remain for a long period of time. Therefore, the choice of what environmental 
controls to employ in a particular period will be affected by previous choices and the consideration of their future impact. 
$ Here and in the sequel, unless otherwise Indicated, the following assumptions are made for the sake of simplicity: 
(i)The environmental system has a single pollutant and environmental quality is one-dimensional; 
hence, our interest will be in one specific pollutant, the concentration of sulphur dioxide at a 
particular location, for example. Assuming a relevant receptor location has been identified, the 
dispersion function summarizes the relationship between concentration at the specific location and 
discharges by the emission sources (producers). 
(ii)The emission rates are linear in normal and treatment inputs. 
(iii)The price and pollution level probabilistic nonnegativity constraints are not considered. 
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(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
and 
(10) 
80 - Wo, &,,I e,, - W; X:.,); 
gjt = gjt(Lljt,L2jt,zljr,Kljr,Kzjf) 
Pt = 4J- 1 + i Pjtgjt(*) + e, 
j= 1 
=c#J,P,-, +B,G,+e, 
= d,P,- 1 + AFL, + e,, 
PO IZ- N(po 3 %J, 
e, - NO, der); 
Pr(P, 2 P,) < a,, t = 1,2, . . . , T, 
K,jf 2 O,r = 1,2, j = 1,2 ,..., J; 
{Lrj,, L2jt; Irjrv 1,jt; xjtr x,17 xk,; ‘J,} 2 0; 
0, = @‘eO,_, + s,, 
QS,) = 0; VS,) = CM,? 
00 = ($oB~oPzo . . . B,o)’ - N(G),; %,J; 
(32) 
(33) 
(34) 
(35) 
(36) 
(37) 
(38) 
(39) 
(40) 
(41) 
where the sequences { v,e,, PO} and the random vectors {en,,c,,nO,S,,OO} are all mutually 
independent, the expectation is taken with respect to all random variables of the problem and 
B, = ULPzt.. 8,J; G = k1,C.l. . .gJ.l)‘; A: = VW,); 
A, = diag(A,,A,,. , . bjt . . A,,); Ajr = Cd Ijrdzjtd3jrd4jrdsjr), 
L, = WI 1rLJ1 l,Kl dz,: *... iL,J,LZJ,I1,1K1JtK2Jt)‘. 
j = 1,2,...,5; 
I 
(42) 
In the context of our discussion, a real adaptive control procedure must recognize the fact that 
as the environmental system progresses through time more data on emission rates and pollution 
levels become available and can be used to update or revise estimates of the dispersion function 
parameters. Thus, estimation of the model parameters should not be regarded separate from the 
derivation of the environmental control policy and optimal environmental controls may profitably 
undertake some probing of the system (in order to investigate it) as well as some directing (in order 
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to maximize the objective function),t i.e. they should fulfill a double role.:: Unfortunately, it has 
not yet been possible to obtain (closed-loop) adaptive control solutions in analytical form. Although 
it is possible to give the formal solution to the dual control problem [e.g. 27,281, the solution leads 
to a functional equation which is very difficult to solve in a general case. Much effort has therefore 
been spent in trying to obtain good suboptimal controls having desirable properties. It is in this 
spirit that we explore the applicability of two suboptimal adaptive control strategies in the context 
of our environmental control problem in this paper. 
The Joint Adaptive Environmental, Price Information Gathering and Measurement 
(of Pollution Level) Control Problem 
Optimal open-loop feedback (OLF) environmental control 
If 0 = (b/II, Bz.. . /lJ)’ were not known, the OLF or updated certainty equivalence strategy could 
be employed to deal with the simultaneous problem of parameter estimation and environmental 
control. First introduced by Dreyfus [29], the OLF technique has been applied in the solution of 
many adaptive control problems. 
At the beginning of the time horizon, the environmental control agency calculates a series of 
regulatory, price information gathering and measurement controls, {(L:j,, I:,,, L:j1; l:,,; xj:, xt,; 
@)I@ = 63,) Vj = 1, 2,. . . , J, s = 1, 2,. . .,S and t = 1,2,.. . , T, using the prior guesses about the 
unknown parameters. As the observed values of emission rates, gjl(.), and pollution level, Y,, 
become available, the pollution control agency revises its guesses or estimates of the unknown 
parameters C$ to obtam O,,, = (~11,~,,,1, . . . /?,.,,,)’ and recalculates {(LTjt, Ifj,, Lrj,, Z;,,; x:, _u:, 
x:,; u,))O = O,,,} Vj = 1, 2 ,..., J, s = 1,2,. . . , S and t = 2, 3,. . . , T. Thus, as the environmental 
system progresses, more and more information becomes available about the dispersion measure 
parameters and the initial guesses at the parameter values may be replaced by better estimates, 
which in turn are used to update the environmental control policy of the remainder of the time 
horizon. 
More precisely, the OLF procedure can be described as follows. Denote the current period by 
t. Let us assume that the environmental control sequence {(LTjl, Lfj,, lTjl, ITjl; xi:, x:,, xzl; UT), 
. . . (L$_,, Lfjr-1, I:jt_1, Zfj,_l; ~$1, x2-1, x&_,; u:_l); j = 1, 2 ,..., J, s = 1, 2 ,..., S) has been 
applied and the corresponding observations on emission rates and pollution levels, {(gjl[.], Y,), 
. . . . (gjf-1C.1, I:-A;j= l,Z..., J}, are obtained. Standing at the beginning of the time period t, we 
wish to determine the future environmental controls {(L:,,, Lzj,, lg, I;;.,; xi:, xz, xc,, u:), . . . . 
(L:jTt LfjTv I:j,, Lzjt; x$, x$-, x;*; ~;);j = 1, 2,. . . , J; s = 1, 2,. . . , S} based on the information UP 
to time (t - 1). 
Let us denote the maximization at this point as follows: 
{(Llj*',L*j,',zlj*,,i2jr,.Xjr,,Xsr'r 
xkt',uta);j = I,&..., J;s= 1,2 ,..., S}&,>,O 
(43) 
t The actual benefits of the additional information depend on whether an “improvement” in the structure of the system 
results in superior future control. The cost of such information emanates, in part, from choosing a current control that is 
less than the optimal from the pure control point of view. As Drtze [26], for example, suggested, “a monopolist may wish 
to depart from the price which maximizes expected profits, simply to learn more about his demand function.” 
$ Fel’dbaum [28] called this feature dual control. By this it is meant that the purpose of control is twofold: to estimate 
unknown parameters of the system and at the same time keep the “output” of the system at a desirable level. These 
objectives are often conflicting, since estimation, in general, is improved by increasing the control. In some situations, 
however, this is not the case. It may happen in special cases that the quality of estimation will not be influenced at all by 
the controls. An example of this is the linear-quadratic-Gaussian problem with known parameters [27]. Such systems are 
called neutral by Fel’dbaum [28]. 
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subject to : 
(1) {(F,. a/ [&IF;) + CF,,(r,,C,,.r,,)F,,l} < 4; 
(2) (P,,. - P,,,, + A*Ca,~l Cvar(~,,)“21e=e,_,,,_,1) 2 0; 
(4) 72,,,, = li,, _ I,,, - 1 + ~$,li,-,,,-,given; 
(7) W?) = (cd,-l,,-112wt4 + de,,) - clL~,-11’w+J 
+ a~,,,)H,,tu,,){H,,cu~,~c~~ - 1 /l - 112 up,, - 11 + &‘) 
. H,.(U,~) + D:(u,.)a$} - ‘Ht.(u,.)([&_ 1p_ ,]‘V[P,, _ 11 
+6iL), V[li,-ll,~,-l,-~,VC~,-llg~~e~; 
(44 
(45) 
(46) 
(47) 
(48) 
(49) 
(50) 
t/r = 1, 2, j = 1, 2,. . . ,_I, t’ = t,. . . T; where 
and 
@-I,,-, = ht-I A,-II,-1, 
%l,,-1 =tBlt-l,,-1~2,-l,1-l...BJr-l,,-l)l~ 
&-I,,-, = (~,-l,,-lrB;-1,,-I)‘. 
(51b) 
The maximization carried out by the above problem yields the following sequence of environmental 
controls: 
{(LF rp[t’lr- l],Lfjr[r'lr- 113 ITj[r’lt- l]r zZj[r’lt- 11; Xj*[t’lr- l]9x,*[*‘(,- 113 (52) 
x~~,~~l_ll;u~~ll_ll);j = 1,2 ,..., J;s = 1,2 ,..., S;t = 2,3 - = ,..., (t 1);t’ t ,..., T}. 1 
The optimal OLF environmental control sequence is obtained from sequence (52) by choosing 
those environmental controls for which r’ = (t - 1); i.e. 
{(CLT~r- l] = LYj[t-l(t- l]l, CLT_$f- I] = LZj[r- Iit- I]19 
** * 
Clij[r- l] = llj[r- IIt- I]19 
CIfjfr-11 = Ifj[t-l/t-l]]; Cxj*;F-l] = xi*lt-llr-l]lr Cxt?-l] = X,*Ir-l~r-l]l~ CXZ[F-I] = x&-l(r-1]19 U3) 
[u$*_,] = u~-lIr-lI]); j = 1, 2 ,..., J; s = 1, 2 ,..., S; t = 2,3 ,..., (T- 1)). 
An algorithm that could be used to estimate the dispersion measure parameters, 0 = (c$/?~, . . . , pJ)‘, 
and the pollution level, P, sequentially, is presented in the Appendix. 
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Optimal open-loop feedback dual (OLFD) environmenta/ control 
The OLF strategy makes the following assumptions regarding the means and covariances of 6,,: 
b,,,, = (@e60); V(6) = 0, t = 1,2,. . . , T. (54) 
Since it is assumed that there is no uncertainty about the transfer function parameters, there is no 
purpose for learning. 
The adaptive learning environmental control strategy, on the other hand, is based on assumptions 
which are extensions of those described above. More specifically, the essence of our new assumptions 
can be paraphrased as follows: the environmental decision maker has to know how to use what 
he knows as well as what he knows about what he shall know.? Here, the unknown transfer 
parameters are still modeled as specified by equation (50) but their means and variances are 
allowed to differ between periods as functions ofemission rates and pollution levels. The distributions 
of $3 ineach period have means and covariances (as well as information matrices) O,,, and 
V(O,)(O[O,]) which are assumed to be related over time in a manner similar to relations (A.7)- 
(A.9), except that the sequences {c; fr}f’ 1 are (at first) assumed fixed and known. That is, the 
updated rules for the means, variances and information matrices of the unknown transfer parameters 
are assumed to be 
@,t = mA-1,*- 1) + F, (55) 
and 
O(G),) = [{@a(O[&_ i])-‘a& + Q,,} - ’ + {k,(~)Cvar(n,)l- ‘fi,(*)}j; 
0 * N(6,; v[G,o] = [o&J- ‘I), 
where 
and 
j=l 
(56) 
(57) 
(58) 
(59) 
and the sequences {e; c!$‘} are assumed fixed and known. Thus, equations (55)-(57) are deterministic 
dynamic equations. 
The adaptive learning environmental control strategies are a sequence of strategy rules for 
periods 1 through T which adapt to the changes that will have taken place in the parameter 
estimates and in the information level, as characterized by (55)-(57), assuming the sequences 
{e; lrp> are fixed and known. In general, only the current set of environmental controls is 
implemented. As the observed emission rates and pollution level of the current period become 
available, the environmental control decision maker revises his guesses or estimates of the unknown 
parameters and recalculates the optimal values of the remaining environmental control variables. 
Hence, as the environmental system progresses, more and more information becomes available and 
t This itatement is nothing other than Bellman’s Principle of Optimality in the context of our stochastic environmental 
control problem, which alternatively can be formulated as a stochastic dynamic programming problem. 
590 A. PAPAKYRIAZIS 
the initial guesses of the transfer function parameter values may be replaced by better estimates, 
which in turn are used to update the environmental control strategy for the remainder of the time 
horizon. 
Theorem. In the context of the adaptive regulatory control problem under consider- 
ation, the decisions on effluent and input taxes cannot be independent of the decisions 
on price information and pollution level measurement controls. In addition, sources 
will, in general, pay different charges.? 
Proof. The derivation of a sequence of environmental control strategies is a stochastic control 
problem. In particular, the mathematical statement of the OLFD problem beginning in the first 
period is as follows: choose ({Lljt, Lljr, Iljr, Izj,; xj,, x,~, XL,; u,); j = 1,2 ,..., J; s = 1,2 ,..., 
S}:=, Z 0) to maximize 
+ .+,$+I, ti’srlrL2sjr + tii)lrrltC2jr(12jr)l - CXjr - ( i x~t + Xlir + cA,(u,))l Ill (60) s=1 
subject to: 
(1) IF,v CfW;) + CF,(~,L,WF;l)} G B,, t = 1,2,. . ., T; (61) 
t2) p; = ipst - C~Op~-l~t-l + i /fjOgjd') + Cl> 
j=l 
(62) 
. {Pl + A*[ct,] [var(pJ1’2 ie=~,]} 2 0, t = 1,2,. . . , T; (63) 
(3) Krjt = (1 - G,jt)Krjf- i + I,,,, K,e = Iz,, (given), r = 1,2,j = 1,2,. . . , J, t = 1,2,. . . , T; 
(4) %I, = $-,I,-, + e:, 
WC) = Wr_%- 11 + C,J - WC+,- 11 + L.,)((V cc- 11 
+ L,,) + (LL,W - ‘(VI%- rl + L.,h ZO - Nfio; V[M = %,); (64) 
(6) (6,,, - a,- II,- 1) = (C% - 11% llr- I) + f?, 
(I[&] - 0[6,-,I) = ([T{(De(O[&J)-‘@& + Q,,}_’ - O[G,_J 
+ { filNvar(~,)l - ’ fM)>), 
0, - N(6,; V[6io] = [ O(i%,)] - ‘); 
(66) 
(67) 
where &(.) is defined in equation (58). 
t This stands in contrast to the case where the objective is to meet emission :tandards in which an efficient allocation 
requires that all sources pay the same charge. 
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Assuming that the innovation sequences (e; c; ?p}T= 1 are fixed and known, the Maximum 
Principle of Pontryagin can be used to solve the above multiperiod environmental control problem. 
In particular, we define the “expanded discounted Hamiltonian” corresponding to the above 
problem as follows: 
s=(S* + 1) A 
’ Cwslj, + Ilj,l + y*j,C-G2j,K2j, + I2jrI S: Xst + xkt + CA,Cu,l 
s=l > 
+ d4jtKljt + dsjtK2jt 
> II) 
- ff + jL2,UJ; + ~*(a,){Cvar(P,)1”21e=e,)) 
II 
($0 - lP,-I(,-I + i PjddIj,Lij, + d2j,Gj, + daj, 
j=l 
. Iljt + d4jtKljt + dSjtK2jt) + fY’ 
II 
+ (‘J’,t[(C$g - l]v[Pt- 11 + bi,t) 
- (6: w, - 11 + &vf,(4{ w4@; w, - 11 
+ &-,)~,(4 + (mu,ld,)) - ‘KhbRw,- 11 + &,)D) 
+ P&21 + trYk&xt - WC%- 11 + L.,)WCfL 11 
+ Lx,) + v&J3 - ‘WC%- 11 + L,,)%) + [‘y;*{c%J + m,- I(,- 1) 
+ ff} - trY;l,[((~~(O[~,_l])-l~~ + CP,,}-’ 
- @,- 1l) + ~~,~lC~~~~~,~l~l~,C~l)ll~ (68) 
where p,, i.l,, i.,, are Lagrangian multipliers corresponding to static constraints (44), (62) and (63) 
and YIj,, Y2j,, Y,,, Yq,, Y,,, Y6,, Y,,, Y,, are costates corresponding to the dynamic constraints 
of=the problem; in particular, costate matrix Y8, is the imputed price of the stock of information 
W,). 
Then, according to the discrete Maximum Principle, if {L:j,, Lfj,, I:],, IT,,; j = 1, 2,. . . , J) is the 
sequence of regulatory controls {xj:, xz, xk:; j = 1, 2,. . . , J; s = 1, 2,. . . , S} is the sequence of price 
information gathering controls, and {u:} is the pollution level measurement controls which together 
maximize the objective function subject to the constraints (44), (62), (63), (30), (44) (48), (32) @4)- 
(67), (58) and if (K:j,; j = 1, 2,. . . , J}, {Ktjt, j = lv 29 *. . ,J}, {P$t}, { vCpti,>*}, {a,;,}, {v(7fi,)*), (e,,,]t 
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(O(GJ*} and (‘P:j,; j = 1, 2 , ..,J) (Vjtij = 1, L...,J}, {W,}, {W}, {T&}, {Y&j, {V,}, {V&J are 
the optimal trajectories of the states and costates respectively, then the following conditions hold. 
(i) Maximization of the Hamiltonian 
(69) 
(70) 
(71) 
(72) 
(73) 
(74) 
(75) 
(76) 
Assuming that the stage where {LIjr, Lzjl, I,,,, I,,,, xjt, x,,, xkrr u,; j = I, 2,. . . ,J; s = 1,2,. . , S} > 0 
has been reached, we have: 
(~H~cd~ll~~~~~t) = (p’~rzj,l,(a~,C.l/aL,,j,) - G’srlr - ~,(Ia(F,VCli,lF;)I(?L,.j,} 
+ {a(F,Cr,~,,rllFl)/aL,,j,}) - Jldbjodlsjd + ‘J’atBjdlsjr 
- CWYd WQJ - 0C6t- 1)1))laL~sjJ3) 
=O, j=l,2 ,..., J,s=1,2 ,..., S,t=1,2 ,..., T; 
(~H~tF_~l/~~~j~) = (P’[T72,l,(afj,C’IIallj,) - ~~~l,{aEc,j~(.)l/aI,jt) - or 
. ({d(F,VCli,lF;)Ial,j,} + (a(F,Cr,c,,r;lF;)iar~j,}) - 4, 
.@jdJjr) + y3jXBjOd3jt) + yljt - C~(tr{~8,C@h 
- 0C6t- I)l))larIjtl~) 
=O, j= I,2 ,..., J,t= 1,2 ,..., T; 
(HkC.IIL,sjt) = @‘II - *srlr - cll({d(F,VCR,lF;)IaL,,jl} 
+ (J(F,Cr,C,,r;lF;laL,Sjt>) - ~lt(bjjodz& + YdPjd2sjt) 
- CWY8,M@ - OC@ - I)l})laL2sjtllj) 
=0, j= 1,2 ,..., J,s=(S, + 1) ,..., S,t= 1,2 ,..., T; 
(aHLC.l/a~,jr) = (P’[ - ~,k,l,(aC,j,C.llar,j,) - ~,({d(F,VC~,lF;)lal,j,} 
+ {a(F,Cr,~:,,r;F;)laI,jr)> + ‘+‘zjtj) 
=O, j= 1,2 ,..,, J,t= 1,2 . . . . . T; 
(~HSrC.l/~xjt) = (P’I( - 1) - A{ J(FtVC%lF;)ldxjtJ + (a(F,Cr,~,r;lF;)laxj,)) 
+ CWrj~XW,) - v(fL I)l))lsxj~l~~ 
=O, j= 1,2 ,..., J,t= 1,2 ,..., T; 
W$,C~llW = (P’%( - 1) - ~,((d(F,VCd,lF/)/ax,,} + {a(F,Cr,c,,r;lF;)lax,,)) 
+ CWTJW,) - WC- JliW4U) 
=O, s=1,2 ,..., S,t=1,2 ,..., T; 
@~%-J*l/~x,,) = (P’%( - 1) - ~,((a(F,V(~i,lFl)ldx,,} + (a(F,Cr,~.,,r;lF;)laX,,)) 
+ C~WJXW,) - WC- I)l~VhJ~) 
= 0, t = 1,2,. . . , T; 
WhC*llW = (p’[T(j.2,A*C~,l{a(vCp,l le=~,)“*/~uJ) - ~~~~At(W~~t~ 
+ Y4,@iVC~J - V~,- d) le=e,)/au,)Ca(tr{Y,~[n(~~) 
- @,- l)i))/au,in) 
=0, t=1,2 ,..., T; 
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W%C~l/&4 =b’CF,WW; + W’Z,WW 
= 0, 1 = 1,2,. . . ) T; 
(dIf$,[~]/di.,,) = (p’[Pl - A*(a,){[var(P,) le=eo]1’2}J) = 0, t = 1,2,. . . , T. (79) 
(ii) Canonical equations 
(K~,-K:j,-,)=(aH~~,[.]/aY’,jt)l*=(-61jlKljr-1 +Iljr)l*, j= 1,2,...,J,t= 1,2,...,T; 
(80) 
(K*~jr-Kfjt-l)=(~H~~~C.II~Y~j~)I*=(-6~jrK~jr-1 + 2jr)l*, j= 192,.-.,J,t= l,L...,T; 
(81) 
tp: - p:- llr- 1) = w~d,CT~wI* = (Cd, - ll)R- lit- 1 
+ f &(dljtLijt + dzjrL;jr + d,Jljt + db&ljr 
j= 1 
+ dsjtk2jr) +Cl*, t = 1,2,..., T; 
(wJ* - wt - 11*1 = @fed,Cw%)l* = cc& - 11 VP, - 11 + &?t) 
u - (6 wr - 11 + aX,)H,(u,){H,(u,H~~VCP, - 11 
+ &,)}I,, f = LZ...,T; 
(E* -g* 
111 ,-I,,-11 = W$,C~l/~‘b,)l, = (fY:,l.> t = L2,...,T; 
(82) 
(65) 
(83) 
= IT&., - WCet - 11 + L.,)NW,- A + &.,I 
+ CLL,Kl} - ‘WC%- ,I + L:.,,)] I*, t = 42,. . . , T; (84) 
(61, - &,I,-,) = @%i,C~l/~Wl~ = ((L-0, -II@-,,,-,) + t?}I*, t = LZ..., T; (85) 
(I[&]* - 0[6,- J*) = (c?H~~,[~]/PI’~,)I,, j = 1,2,. . .,.l,t = 1,2,. . . , T; (86) 
(P’f’:j,-Y:i,-l)= -(aH~~,[.]/aK,jt-1)1*, j= 1,2,...,J,t= 1,2,...,T; 037) 
(PYI!j, - Y?jl-,) = -(aH~~,C.]/aK2j*-1)I*, j = l,Z,...,J,t = 1,2,..., T; WV 
(P% - W-1) = -(~~~~b,C~]/c’C~~-1,,_,3)1,, t = 1,2,...,T; (89) 
(P’y:, - ‘+‘&-I) = -(aH~,C.l/aCv(t;,-l)])I,. c = 1,2,...,T; (90) 
(PW - W-1) = -(aH:‘,,C.]/aCff,-,,,_,])1*, t = 1,2,...,T; (91) 
(Py’,*, - %-I) = -(~%i,C~l/~C’W- Al)l*, t = I,&. . . , T; (92) 
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(PW, - ‘y:,-I) = -(aH,Sd,C.l/aC~,-1,,-,1)1*, t = L2 ‘..., T; 
WQ, - Y,*,- 1) = -(aH~,[+TJ[v(~,_ I)])/*, t = 1,2,. . .) T. 
(iii) Boundary conditions 
Kljo = R,jo(giVen), j = 1,2,. .,,J; 
K2j0 = IZ*jo(given), j = 1,2,. . . , J; 
PO = P,(given); 
V(P,) = Zp,(given); 
X0 = i,(given); 
V(rc,) = &, (given); 
0, = Go(given); 
n/(0,) = n/(6,) = (OIGo])-’ (given); 
(pT‘YrjT) = 0, j = 1,2,. . . ,J; 
(pT‘Y:jT) = 0, j = 1,2,. . .,.I; 
($Y% = 0; 
(PTY&) = 0,; 
(PWT) = 0,; 
(PTY&) = 0; 
(Pw = 0; 
(pTY&) = 0. 
(93) 
(94) 
(95) 
(96) 
(97) 
(98) 
(99) 
(100) 
(101) 
(102) 
(103) 
(104) 
(105) 
(106) 
(107) 
(108) 
(109) 
(110) 
Notice that the two-point boundary-value problem that results from the application of the 
Maximum Principle to the problem under study does not separate between the joint optima1 
regulatory-price information gathering controls on the one hand and the pollution level measurement 
controls on the other, as in the case of known transfer function parameters. More precisely, the 
decisions on the amount of emission rates, on the amount invested in information gathering and 
on the pollution level measurements are interdependent and have to be made simultaneously. This 
is so because equations (69), (70), (71) and (76) involve all three categories of control variables; for 
example, since {d[F,V(lE,)F~]/Ll,jt} as welJ as {alF,(r,~,,r;)F;/aL,,jl} involve (Xjr,x,,, xkr; 
j= I,2 ,..., J;s = 1,2 )...) S} and [a(tr{Y&(O[O,] - O[O,_ ,])})/aL,,j,] involves u,, conditions (69) 
imply that the employment rate of the sth normal variable factor by the jth firm at time t, Ll,jf, 
will depend in part on: the price information gathering controls, IXjl,x,,, xL,; 
j= 1,2 )...) J;s= 1,2 )..., S} [which, via equations (73), (74) and (75), will in turn depend on Lt,j,]; 
and on the pollution level measurement control, u, [which via equation (76) will in turn depend 
on Ll,j,]. Hence, the decisions on all three sets of controls should be made simultaneously and the 
emission rate, price information gathering and pollution level measurement controls are found to 
. Controlling environmental systems 595 
be inseparable.t, $
Once determined, the optimal environmental policy must be implemented. Besides direct 
centralized enforcement, it is important to access the feasibility of decentralized ecision making 
procedures, such as using taxes. In the model under consideration, it is clear that if: 
(1) information about output and input prices are the same at both the firm and 
the agency level; 
(2) output and input prices are uncorrelated; 
(3) the optimal level of price information gathering and pollution level measurement 
controls are known; 
(4) the number of emitter forms, J, remains unchanged over the planning horizon T; 
and 
(5) the discount rate CO, is the same for both the control agency and the individual firms; 
then, the solution of the environmental control problem does yield such taxes. In particular, if the 
pollution control agency can impose on the jth firm: 
(i) the effluent charge:§ 
and 
(ii) the (negative) input tax: 
[-~,{8(var[F,n’,])/~(input)lj,}~, 1 = 1,2,...,(5 + S + 1); 
then, the expected (net) value of other goods produced would be maximized, subject to the specific 
set of probabilistic environmental constraints. Q.E.D. 
Finally, it should be noted that the approach described above yields a set of environmental 
control rules which are tentative in the sense that only the regulatory (emission rate), price 
information gathering and pollution level measurement controls of the current (first) period are 
meant to be implemented. The resulting emission rates and pollution level are then used by the 
environmental control decision maker to revise his guesses or estimates of the unknown transfer 
function parameters and recalculates a new open-loop dual set of environmental controls which 
are going to be implemented for the next step and so on. 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
Uncertainty in environmental control problems can be separated into three broad categories: 
uncertainty about the structure and parameters of the objective function; uncertainty about the 
mathematical form and the exact parameter values of the environmental system dynamics (dispersion 
relationships); and uncertainty in the measurement of the state variables or pollution concentration 
levels. 
Since uncertainty usually reduces returns from an enterprise, the introduction of uncertainty in 
an environmental control problem broadens the set of decisions that an environmental control 
manager must make; specifically, additional information or data can be obtained to lessen 
t It should be clear from our discussion that the pollution level measurement control, u,, cannot be determined Q priori, 
because of the jointness of its determination with regulatory and price information gathering controls. 
$ At the level of generality considered so far, of course, one cannot write the solution form for the emission rate, price 
information gathering and (pollution level) measurement controls. If the specific forms of the functions h,(.), C,,,(.), C,,,(.), 
CA,(.) and I(x,) were known. however. the problem necessary conditions could be used to determine the above controls for 
periods I through T. 
@Because of the possibility of generating information about the uncertain transfer function parameters, this adaptive 
effluent charge reflects the incentive of society to probe for information which can improve environmental control in the 
future. 
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uncertainty [30,3 11. In general, information acquisitions can be classified either as active or passive 
learning. The active learning form of information acquisition is applicable only to a sequential 
decision-making process. The other aspect of learning is to evaluate the costs of several sources of 
uncertainty. On the basis of these comparative costs, the environmental manager can decide where 
research or sampling efforts (passive learning) should be directed toward lessening uncertainty. It 
is apparent, therefore, that an environmental control manager is in the position of having to make 
a continual series of decisions under uncertainty. The decision set includes both decisions on the 
levels at which to set regulatory or emission controls and actions to be taken to reduce uncertainty. 
As the work reported in this paper has demonstrated, the assumption that these two types of action 
are always independent of one another violates reality. 
In this paper the implications of uncertainty in dispersion relationship and objective function 
parameters as well as in the measurement of pollution levels for emission, price information and 
measurement of concentration controls have been explored. The fundamental result of the paper 
has been the Nonseparation Theorem, which, under the conditions specified, states that the optimal 
effluent and input taxes (regulatory controls) cannot be determined independently of the price 
information pollution level measurement controls and thus the decisions on all three sets of controls 
have to be made simultaneously. Furthermore, the analysis has shown that first, the decisions on 
emission rates and on price information gathering activities are always interdependent; and second, 
in the case of a risk-averse planner and risk neutral polluters, efficiency requires the imposition of 
an input tax as a means of internalizing the costs of uncertainty. Finally, a new method of obtaining 
an environmental policy with dual characteristics has been suggested. This new environmental 
control policy, which is obtained by introducing a learning factor in the agency’s objective function, 
attempts to both precisely estimate the environmental process parameters and make good 
environmental control. 
Our framework can be generalized in several possible directions. First, given the inherent difficulty 
of measuring emission rates, one might wish to construct a model with stochastic environmental 
waste discharges. In particular, in the case where emission rates are subject to stochastic disturbances, 
the internalization policy should be stated not in terms of (gij,; i = 1, 2,. . . , I; j = 1, 2,. . ,J)f= 1 (an 
inaccessible level of emission rates from the point of view of the policy maker) but instead in terms 
of say yij,, a stochastic measurement of the emission rate, gij,(.). From the standpoint of the jth 
firm, gij,(.) is deterministic while its measured value, L’ijr, is stochastic. The relationship between 
these variables can be written as 
Yijr = gij,(Lij,* Kij,, lijr; Lzj,, K,jr) + 6ijr(uijt)L.ijt, i = 1,2,. . . , I,j = 1, 2,. . , J, t = 1,2,. . , T, 
where I;ijr is a continuous random variable with zero mean and variance &. The scalar hij,(uij,) 
is, in general, a linear or nonlinear function of juij,; i = 1,2,. . ,I; j = 1,2,. . . , .I,,< 1, the (emission rate) 
measurement policy variable determined by the regulatory agency. Second, the analysis could also 
be pursued assuming other specifications of the objective function. For example, instead of 
maximizing the expected value of other goods functional, E( I/ oor.r), subject to a set of probabilistic 
environmental standards, the environmental authority could maximize the expected utility function 
U which is a function U({ VoGF.r, ‘; {(P, - P,,)F=,}) of the value of other goods Vo,,,, and 
environmental quality (P, - P,,)T= , . Finally, by concentrating on the criterion of economic efficiency 
only, we have implicitly assumed that other goals, such as obtaining an acceptable income 
distribution, reducing inflation and unemployment, for example, are achieved via other means that 
are not instrumental in defining the environmental control strategies. A more complete treatment 
of the environmental control problem should clearly take into consideration the diversity of goals, 
such as environmental quality, income distribution and employment. All these possible extensions 
are, however, left for future work. 
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APPENDIX 
Supposethatthepreviousestimatese),_,,,_, =($,_ ,,,_, ~l,-,,,-I...~,,-,,,-,) 
the estimate of the state, p,_ ,,,_, . 
are available. These can be used to update 
on receipt of the latest measurement Y,. The actual environmental system (37,38,35) is 
modeled as 
P, = dt-ll,-lP,-l + B,-l~,-lG, +e, 
=b,-,,,-,P,-, +iV-II,-IL,+e,, 
k; = H,(u,)Pt + D,(u,)v,. 
(A.11 
(A.3 
Equations (A.1). (A.2) and (35) are now in the required form for Kalman filtering to provide the state estimator 
$,t, = .E(P,I Y’). The state estimator is then: 
(A.3) 
Theparameterestimate&_,,,_, =($,_, ,,_, ~,,_,,,_l...~,,_l,,-l) can now be updated using the previous state estimate 
p,- r,,- 1. The actual environmental system (37,35) is represented by 
P, = ~,Js,-,t,-r + QG, + e, 
=d,Is-,,,-, +A:L,+e,, 
Y, = H,(u,)P, + D,(u,)K:. 
(A.4) 
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Substituting from system (A.4) into equation (35) for P, gives 
r, = W(uM#- I,,- 1 + W, + 4 + W,)V 
= ffr(G#@- IJ~- I + Hid 
i_ ~ 
i Pjtg,rC~l + CM&, + D,(uJW 
,= 1 
4, 
= W,C~,l~t - 1 ,r- , i4Cu,ls,,C~l) :I’ + n,, 
_i, (A.3 
where n, = (H,[u,]e, + D,[u,]l$ with E(n,) = 0 and var(n,) = E(n,n,.) = {[H,(u,)&] + [D,(u,)a~,]}~,,~ + 0,26,~,, since e, and ,: 
are uncorrelated white noises. Defining R,(u,; p,_ ,,,_ ,; kj,(.)]j= ,) = (H,[u,]p,- ,,,_ I iH,[u,]g,,[,]1....H,[u,]g,,[.]). equation 
(AS) becomes 
Y,=R,(u,;P,-,,,-,;~jRjt(‘)]j=l)O, +n,3 
For a time-varying parameter system, i.e. when 0, = @,,a,_, + S,, we have 
X = R,(“,;P!- Ii,- l;gjf[‘]f=l)@r + “r~ 
0, = @,O,_, + s,. 
b4.6) 
Equations (A.6) and (AS) are now in the required form for Kalman filtering to provide the updated estimate of the unknown 
parameters vector as well as its updated variance-covariance (or Fisher information) matrix. Hence, we have 
6,,, = (V% - I ,, - 1) + c. (A.7) 
W4) = (QeVC6, - 11% + Q,,) - (@,,w% - ,I@& + a;P,,)Rq,){R,(.)(co,VC8, - ,I% + QJW 
+ W:CG& + D:C4d,,) - ‘f%WbW%- J@;, + Q,,) (A.8) 
and 
where 
O(6,) = [n/(8,)]-’ = [{@e(OIOr_ 1])-‘U$ + a,,}-’ + {R,(Xvar[n,]-‘)R(.)}Il, (A.9) 
c = (@,,WL 11@;( + Q,,)R;(.){A,(.M~,VCB,- I% 
+ %)~A9 + H:C~,ld., + D:C4d,,) - ’ 
CY, - (ftC.l% ,,,- 1% 0, - Jw,; whJ)l- ‘). (A.lO) 
The quantity c is the so-called residual or innovation in the Kalman filter. An important property of the filter is 
that the sequence {c$‘} is zero mean and “white”, with Gaussian statistics [e.g. 321. 
